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Abstract
Practices within markets are widely regulated and sometimes contested on the basis of 
moral judgments. Moral entrepreneurs challenge markets and market practices while 
firms and industry actors defend them, leading to moral struggles opposing different 
orders of worth. Based on an historical case study, this paper develops a theoretical 
framework to study moral struggles in markets as social and political processes around 
commensurability. It identifies three core arenas in which moral struggles play out: ideas, 
where the morality of specific practices itself is contested and actors ground their moral 
claims in different institutional orders for legitimat-ion; the economy, where the market 
viability of changing moral standards is at stake; and politics, where commensuration 
reflects political power struggles. Through a socio-historical analysis of the fight against 
battery cages in Swiss egg production in the 1970s and 1980s, the study fleshes out how this 
moral struggle played out along these dimensions, focusing on the competing discourses, 
strategies, and tactics of the main moral entrepreneurs and industry associations.
Keywords: Market; Morality; Moral struggle; Commensurability; Social move-
ments; Valuation.
I S A N E G G A N E G G , or does the way it is produced make
a difference? Should animal welfare be a concern for the producers in 
this market, and how? Are consumers willing to pay more for eggs
produced in “animal-friendly” circumstances, or does “grub always
come before ethics”? In the 1970s, these questions were the object of
passionate debates in Switzerland, opposing animal protectionists
mobilized against the use of battery cages in egg production to
chicken farmers vehemently defending its benefits. The moral strug-
gle between these two groups addressed a question as old and
contested as markets themselves: are markets moral?
1Published in European Journal of Sociology 
/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie 57, issue 3, 419-450, 2016,
which should be used for any reference to this work
Social theorists and economists have long been divided about the
morality of markets. Some celebrate their benefits for collective
wellbeing and individual freedom, while others hold them responsible
for the destruction of the social fabric of societies through commod-
ification and the promotion of self-interest [Hirschman 1992; 
Fourcade and Healy 2007]. When anthropologists or economic 
sociologists look at the morality of markets, they reveal that markets
are not outside of the realm of moral values; morals enable, sustain
and limit markets in many ways [Beckert 2012, Fischer 2014a, Zelizer 
2011]. Practices within existing markets are widely contested and 
regulated on the basis of moral judgments. Labor law and the welfare
state, for instance, are the result of social and political struggles
around the limitation and regulation of markets according to moral
values [Polanyi 1944].
While the territory of markets has expanded with the neoliberal
reforms since the late 20th century, the same period has also seen 
heightened contention around the consequences of markets, global-
ization and industrialization. “Moral entrepreneurs” [Becker 1997]—
often social movement-like organizations advocating a common
cause––fight for market regulation to set moral boundaries and
develop moral categories in markets such as fair trade or green
products. An increasing number of studies show how social move-
ments contest and change markets [King and Pearce 2010; Soule 2012; 
Walker 2012 Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey 2008], but also how firms 
and industries, especially when challenged to do so, fight back to
counter movement activism [Walker 2014; Walker and Rea 2014], 
often justifying their actions in moral terms [Zelizer 1983; Zelizer 
1994].
When market practices are morally challenged, different “orders of
worth” [Boltanski and Th!evenot 2006] clash: the efficiency and 
productivity justifying actions in markets are challenged by other
principles of evaluation of objects, for instance, social justice, animal
rights, or ecology. At stake is the commensuration of competing and
seemingly incommensurable values and goods [Espeland and Stevens
1998]. Studies have pointed to the multiplicity and antagonism of 
orders of worth and the discursive dimension of finding common
justifications [Boltanski and Th!evenot 2006], but the social and 
political processes through which the moral embeddedness of market
actions changes in the course of moral struggles has not received as
much attention. How do fights on the morality of market practices
play out? How do moral boundaries become redefined? This paper
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uses an historical case study on animal rights in the production of eggs
in Switzerland in order to gain more general insights into the social
and political processes through which the moral embeddedness of
markets are contested and change. It argues that moral struggles take
place in the distinct and interrelated arenas of ideas, markets, and
politics, and sheds light on how commensuration is contested and
negotiated in each one of them.
The emotional debates and public actions around the use of battery
cages in the Swiss egg industry lasted for more than 15 years and 
provide us with detailed insight into a particular moral market
struggle. Between the early 1970s and up to the late 1980s, animal 
welfare activists and the egg industry opposed each other, often
vehemently, resulting in the redrawing of a moral boundary in this
market through the banning of battery cages. The case can serve as an
analytic lens into the functioning of moral struggles on markets.
Studying moral struggles in the case of such a common and trivial
good as eggs also constitutes a welcome complement to existing
research on morals and markets and/or valuation, which has mostly
focused on particularly controversial goods such as life insurance
[Zelizer 1983], nature [Fourcade 2011], or organs [Healy 2006; Steiner 
2010]. In contrast, the analysis presented here points to the relevance 
of moral struggles and moral categories for an everyday standard good
that is only weakly differentiated. Using a broad range of sources, in
particular a database of articles from the main publications of industry
organizations and social movement actors as well as expert interviews
with key actors, the paper develops a detailed socio-historical analysis
of a moral market struggle. The study thus contributes to a better
understanding of how markets are morally embedded and the pro-
cesses through which the moral underpinnings of markets are
challenged and change. The theoretical framework and analytic
categories developed can be usefully applied to analyze a broad range
of similar cases of moral struggles in markets. Finally, by studying the
struggles and negotiations on the moral embedding of a given market,
it also contributes to the literature on the sociology of morality by
investigating morality “in the wild” [Hitlin and Vaisey, 2010: 11].
The first two short sections lay out the theoretical framework of the
study. After a discussion of the case selection and methodology, the
empirical part starts out with a descriptive overview of the controversy
on battery cages in Switzerland. This is followed by an analysis of the
moral struggle as it unfolds in the three arenas of ideas, markets, and
politics.
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What is moral about markets? Albert Hirschman [1992] distinguished 
between views celebrating markets’ positive consequences and views
condemning their effects. In the first category, classic political economy
and the “doux commerce” thesis see the pursuit of self-interest through
markets as a liberating force bringing about individual freedom and
collective wellbeing. Historically, the rise of markets was thus a deeply
normative project. In this view, which also underpins modern-day
economics, the morality of markets lies in their efficiency, which is said to
have beneficial consequences for societies; but these desirable outcomes can
only be achieved if, individually, market actors act as “a-moral” utility
maximizers. On the opposite side, critical social theorists, reacting in
particular to the brutal social consequences of industrialization in the 19th 
century, have accused markets of having destructive consequences on
societies. By turning everything into commodities, markets  are said to
compromise the moral fabric of human relations. Polanyi [1944] famously 
argued that the extension of market systems to all spheres of social life led
to an economic system dis-embedded from social control with devastating
results. But while the celebratory and critical views of markets di-
ametrically disagree on the consequences of markets for societies, they
nonetheless share a common view of market behavior as universally
driven by self-interest and as outside the realm of moral considerations.
Polanyi, however, also argued that the destructive outcomes of markets
provoked counter-movements attempting to regulate and place boundaries
on markets. He thus laid the foundation at a third view, widely shared by
economic sociologists and anthropologists. Here, markets are not seen as
outside of the moral views and struggles that take shape within societies
[Beckert 2012; Fourcade 
and Healy, 2007; Hann and Hart, 2011; Miller  2001]. They do not 
constitute a separate sphere where only efficiency and self-interest rule.
Instead, they are described as local orders with specific conventions, logics,
or “moral economies” [Thompson 1971; Sayer 2000], which inform what 
practices are legitimate and appropriate and are “continually enacted in the
dialectics of everyday social life” [Fischer, 2014a: 7]. This includes 
efficiency, but also many other values such fairness, professional ethics,
environmental justice or animal rights. Morals therefore are not just
disguises for actors’ material interests: people also act morally to maintain
collective moral orders, that is “the shared beliefs and commitments of what
is understood to be good, right and just (and not merely a personal
preference, taste, or desire)” [Farrell, 2015: 11].
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Moral values enable, sustain, and limit practices in markets
[Beckert 2012]. Most existing studies focus on the latter. Certain 
goods, for instance blood and organs [Healy 2006; Steiner 2010], can 
be deliberately kept outside of market exchanges. But these moral
limits of markets are empirically variable and susceptible to change
[Steiner and Trespeuch 2014; Zelizer 1983]. Fewer studies have paid 
attention to the ways certain practices within established markets
become the object of moral struggles (for an example, see M€unnich
2015). But many debates on market behavior have important moral 
dimensions concerning producers and consumers alike. What is a fair
price for coffee? Should retailers stop giving out disposable plastic
bags? Should hens be kept in cages? Often, such questions about good
or bad, wrong or right behavior with regard to environmental, social, or
animal rights issues become codified in laws circumscribing economic
activity, thus again normatively limiting market practices [Beckert
2012]. But these moral questions are also directly addressed in markets, 
not through laws, but through forms of private regulation [Bartley
2007], moral codes and cultures, through the rise of moral niche 
markets (like green or fair trade products), or on the consumer side
through “political consumerism” [Micheletti 2003]. Moral concerns 
can thus become part of product valuation strategies where they
are integrated into markets as new categories of quality [Beckert
and Aspers 2011; Beckert and Musselin 2013; Callon, M!eadel and 
Rabeharisoa 2002; Gourevitch  2011]. The next section develops a frame-
work to study moral market struggles across these different dimensions.
A theoretical framework  to  study moral struggles on markets
Markets are arenas of social interaction that provide a social structure
and institutional order for the voluntary exchange of rights in goods and
services [Beckert 2009]. Market order builds on shared conventions that 
are rooted in formal rules, cultural frames, and actor networks [Beckert
2010]. A given market order or “field settlement” [Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012] thus encompasses the formal and informal rules,  and
cultural understandings that coordinate the interactions of participants in
a market and are followed and enacted equally by producers, distributors,
market mediators, and consumers. This includes shared moral concep-
tions of what actions are legitimate and appropriate.
Such taken-for-granted and morally sustained agreements in markets
can be challenged on moral terms. Often, social movements are the
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1 Technology is a fourth arena of com- side, sought to find technological
solutions—innovative barn systems—that
could reconcile productivity and animal
welfare.
mensuration revealed by the empirical
study but it is not addressed here for lack
of space. Actors, especially on the industry
initiators of a changing relation between morals and markets, when they
act as moral entrepreneurs in markets [Balsiger 2014]. A number of 
studies have looked at the movements challenging corporations in
“contentious markets” [King and Pearce 2004; Walker 2012] and 
at the  economic consequences of movements. While moral
entrepreneurs chal-lenge practices in markets on moral terms, their “moral
crusades” [Becker 1997], more often than not, are met with resistance 
[Balsiger 2015a; 2015b]. The actors whose behavior is singled out as 
immoral are likely to respond by defending established practices; in doing
so they develop moral arguments and delve into available moral
justifications of market behavior [Fourcade and Healy
2007; Haveman and Rao 1997]. In other words, when market orders are 
contested on moral terms, moral struggles develop—“power struggles
[.] between  competing  groups and  moral 
interests” [Massengill and Reynolds 2010: 497], which concern institu-
tional aspects (formal rules governing production and market exchanges)
and the cultural frames that guide the behavior of market participants.
The actors of moral struggles mobilize on behalf of different values
and put forward different conventions—“whether self-consciously (as
in the case of social responsibility) or in the name of neutrality and
objectivity (as in the case of efficiency)” [Fourcade and Healy 2007: 
304]. At their core, the struggles are concerned with commen-suration 
[Espeland and Stevens 1998]. The commensuration of seemingly 
incommensurable goods is at stake: orders of worth [Boltanski and
Th!evenot 2006] clash when “outside” values such as environmental or 
social justice challenge the values of existing market conventions
[McInerney 2014: 11]. Beyond the discursive dimension of finding 
common justifications [Boltanski and Th!evenot 2006], 
commensuration is a socially and politically contentious process.
While some actors seek commensuration, others defend the incom-
mensurability of “separate spheres,” whether for strategic reasons or
deeply held convictions [Espeland and Stevens 1998: 333-334]. The 
goal of this study is to shed more light on how such processes unfold.
Based on the empirical case study, one can identify three
distinct but interrelated arenas of moral struggles within which
commensura-tion is contested and negotiated and along which the
struggles must be analyzed: ideas, markets, and politics.1 
Differentiating between these arenas helps unravel the complex
web through which morality
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2 1991 is when the provision on the cage
ban was finally fully implemented, after a 10-
year transitional period. 1970 is a few years
before the controversy on animal rights in the
egg industry started to emerge.
informs markets. Table 1 resumes the three arenas, the issues at stake 
in each one of them, and the main strategies actors use to address
them. The first one concerns debates about morality itself, that is, the
boundaries between the moral and immoral or between competing
moral orders. The legitimacy of certain (market) practices, such as
salaries or animal husbandry, is contested, and actors use different
strategies to buttress their competing moral claims on what is right or
wrong. In particular, one can observe how opposing actors ground
their moral claims [Abend 2014] in different orders of worth and seek 
to validate them through external authorities.
The second arena is the market itself or, more precisely, the question
of the “market viability” of new moral boundaries. The underlying issue
is the cost of new (supposedly more moral) practices and regulation as
well as the contested development of new ethical product qualities.
Through moral work, moral entrepreneurs vie to establish new qualities,
change consumer preferences and develop new markets. Here, valuation
can lead to commensurability. Established industry actors can contest the
viability of moral practices, for instance by denouncing their cost or their
pertinence, but they can also embrace them as new market opportunities.
The third arena, finally, relates to the politics of moral struggles.  Here,
the issue at stake is regulation. This arena reveals how moral struggles
are also political struggles, reflecting status and power, alliances and
political strategies, and the general social and political contexts in which
they play out. Politics, in this sense, is a broad instance of commensu-
ration [Espeland and Stevens 1998], as fights for moral goods are broken 
down into power struggles, deals and compromises that respect specific
institutional rules.
Methods and case analysis
This paper consists of an in-depth socio-historical analysis of the
case of egg production and animal welfare in Switzerland, 1970-1991. 
In this time period, a controversy emerged around chicken husbandry
in the egg industry (see detailed case description below)2. Studying 
moral issues with regard to markets for standard goods constitutes
a particularly promising research strategy since it can reveal how
moral issues also penetrate markets for such trivial everyday products
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Arena Issue at stake Strategies
Ideas What practices are
moral/immoral
Grounding and legitimation
of moral claims
Market Market viability Developing/contesting
moral market categories
Politics Regulation Lobbying, coalition-
building, collective action
as eggs. Most existing studies on morals and on valuation dynamics in
markets look at goods and practices that are very controversial (i.e.
child labor, organs, nature) [Fourcade 2011; Healy 2006; Zelizer 1994] 
and symbolic (i.e. art) [Velthuis 2005]. Yet very common and weakly 
differentiated standard goods can also become the object of moral
struggles. In particular in food production and consumption, moral
categories have become increasingly important [Johnston and
Baumann 2009; Johnston, Szabo and Rodney 2011]. Indeed, it could 
be argued that for undifferentiated goods, moral qualities can be
a lucrative strategy of qualification and distinction. Eggs are a charac-
teristic example of this: an everyday good that becomes invested with
new moral meaning around the question of the relation between
humans and animals and the industrialization of food production
[Fischer 2014a; Fischer 2014b]. Yet the development of a moral 
quality for eggs was, as I will show, an extremely contested process.
The goal of the empirical analysis was to retrace the moral
struggles surrounding animal welfare in the egg industry, studying
the strategies and discourses of the main actors on all sides of the
moral struggle. Through a preliminary explorative study based on
a literature and press review, I identified the main actors of this
controversy on which I focused the analysis: the egg industry and in
particular its main industry and professional associations during the
historical period under study—the Schweizerische Eierverwertungsgenos-
senschaft (seg) (Swiss cooperative of egg distribution) and the Verein 
Schweizerischer Gefl€ugelhalter (vsgh) (association of Swiss poultry 
farmers), as well as the Schweizerische Gefl€ugelzuchtschule (Swiss poultry
farming school). On the animal welfare advocacy side, the Schweizerische
Tierschutz (sts) (Swiss animal protection) and the Konsumenten Arbeits-
gruppe (kag) (Consumer working group), a group promoting free-
range
T a b l e  1
Arenas of moral struggles in markets
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3 Before 1974, the journal was called Gefl€ugel und Kleinvieh (Poultry and Small Livestock).
eggs. To a lesser extent, I also studied the positions and discourses of
core political actors and other economic actors, in particular retailers.
The analysis is qualitative and historical and builds on a broad range of
sources. Most importantly, I built up a data base from the principal
publications of the core collective actors in this controversy. For the
egg industry side, my main source was the Schweizerische Gefl
€ugelzeitung3 (Swiss poultry journal), a bi-weekly (and later monthly) 
trade journal of the industry, edited at the Swiss poultry farming
school. I reviewed all the journal’s editions from 1972 to 1992 and 
digitalized articles relating to the animal rights issue. For the sts, my 
main source was the organization’s publication, Schweizer Tierschutz:
Du 1 die Natur (Swiss animal protection: you and nature) for which I 
proceeded in the same manner. Importantly, this journal also
published the sts’ regular three-year activity reports. For the kag, I also 
consulted the organization’s newsletter, publicly available from 1985 
onwards. For previous years (1975-1984), the organization published 
only infrequent (primarily annual), newsletters, which I obtained
directly from the kag. The contents of these documents, as well as all 
other assembled data, were analyzed using standard techniques of
qualitative data analysis. The main sources were complemented with
other publications by the different organizations (booklets or
brochures), some archival material that was either publicly available or
provided to me by interviewees, a press review, as well as nine
interviews with core past or present actors of the controversy (three
from representatives of kag, two from sts, two from the poultry 
industry, one from the retailers, and one from the public
administration).
I will now turn  to a rapid factual overview of  the conflict
between  animal welfare advocates and the egg industry on the
question of chicken husbandry in Switzerland. The following
analytical section looks first at the struggles concerning morality itself
(what is animal welfare), then at the struggle surrounding market
acceptance of a new ethical quality for eggs, and finally at the political
dimension of this moral struggle.
Egg production and animal welfare in Switzerland, 1970-1991
In the early 1970s, the production of Swiss eggs was guided by an 
imperative of rationalization. In the course of the previous decade or
so, new systems of chicken husbandry had been developed and widely
introduced. More and more, egg production was undertaken in
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4 I put “farm” in quotation marks because the
terms used to designate such facilities––farms,
family farms, factory farms, animal factories,
etc.—became a central issue of contention.
5 The number put forward by the egg
producing industry; sgz 8, August 22, 1991.
6 The number put forward in a report by
A. Nabholz, who was director of the Federal
Veterinary Ministry 1966-77; “10 Jahre eidg-
en€ossisches Tierschutzgesetz und -verordnung”,
see also sgz 8, August 22, 1991.
specialized “farms,”4 with producers focusing exclusively on egg 
production with no other farming activities carried out. This was not
the case for all egg producers, but even those who had mixed forms of
agricultural production started to use newly developed systems
of  chicken husbandry during the 1960s. These systems were called 
chicken batteries and consisted of cages for up to four hens, each
occupying the approximate space of a standard A4 size sheet of paper. 
Cages were stacked on top of each other, creating four or even more
levels. In these cages, hens would lay their eggs on a grid from which the
eggs rolled down on a kind of elevator, which carefully transported them
to a band-conveyor on the ground floor. From there, they were carried to
a screening  machine. Faeces—an  unwanted  by-product  of
these laying  hens––would fall down into a container below the
battery, where it dried and ultimately peeled off into a defection canal.
Thanks to such systems, the collection of eggs was fully automatized.
Actual farmers were not needed; human activity resembled that of an
automated factory, with workers checking from time to time to see
whether everything was in order and supervising production. It was
like a machine––an animal machine, in Ruth Harrison’s famously coined
words.
In the early 1970s, this was the dominant form of egg production in 
Switzerland (and, in most countries, it still is) [Bittman 2015; Garner 
1993]. While not all producers had the latest chicken battery models—they 
were, unsurprisingly, quite expensive—the large majority of them did
hold chicken in batteries, and the bulk of Swiss eggs were produced in
specialized units. According to statistics published in the Schweizerische
Gefl€ugelzeitung (sgz), in 1973 more than 50% of  all  laying hens were 
held  in broods of 2,000 or more, with 24.1% in broods of over  10,000 
birds. And while there are no clear statistics about how many of them were
held in cages, estimations for 1981 range from 65%5 to 95%6. Battery 
cages are  a highly efficient  way of  producing eggs.
Full automation means  that  very  few workers are needed, and costs
can thus be brought down significantly. Because hens can hardly move in
their cages and eggs automatically roll down, the eggs are rarely damaged
and do not need to be collected by human workers. And the hens cannot
fight with each other for lack of space—batteries thus also have certain
advantages in terms of hygiene and longevity of the animals [Garner 1993].
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7 The wwf, for instance, published an
illustrated book for children which featured
a chapter entitled Die Maschinen-Tiere, pic-
turing and juxtaposing the lives of farm
animals on traditional farms and on factory
farms. The sts reprinted this chapter in its
members’ magazine in early 1975 (Zeitschrift
Schweizer Tierschutz, Nr. 1/2, February 1975).
Batteries were not only the most efficient way of producing eggs;
chicken farmers were also very proud of this highly rationalized form
of production. The description above of the functioning of a chicken
battery comes from the poultry industry’s trade journal (sgz). In an 
article with the headline “An exemplary battery plant,” the author
lauded the unprecedented cleanliness and efficiency of the plant. The
industry’s goal and its professional pride were to produce eggs that
could compete with imported eggs while still paying chicken farmers a
living. That was possible thanks to an “extraordinary development” in
the egg industry, which had allowed producers “to make up for cost
increases through heightened efficiency and performance and the
rationalization of methods of husbandry and thus offer eggs to consumers
for the same price as twenty years ago” (sgz, 7, May 30, 1974).
No mention was made of how the hens might feel, trapped in these
cages, and reduced to their function of laying eggs. In early
1972, when  the article was published, such questions were hardly 
discussed, and certainly not taken seriously by egg producers. The
writer praising battery plants in early 1974 could not know that, just a 
few years later, they would come to symbolize the damage caused by
industrial food production, as the welfare of farm animals became a
major issue in Swiss politics. In 1973, Swiss citizens had approved a 
constitutional amend-ment on animal protection with a large majority of
83%, making animal protection a federal competency. Animal welfare 
activists had been pushing for such an article for a long time, and the early
1970s were  a favorable context  for  them.  While the 
traditional Schweizer Tierschutz (sts), the largest Swiss animal welfare 
organization, had been around for nearly a century, its field of activity
had mostly been limited to pets and wildlife, with scarce attention to
farm animals. Yet the 1960s had  brought  about a new critique of the use 
of animals in industrial food production, and a new generation of
activists criticizing the detrimental effects of industrialization and
economic growth on various others—the environ-ment, developing
countries, but also animals [Garner 1993; Jasper  and  Nelkin 1992]. 
Ruth Harrison’s book Animal Machines: the New Factory Farming
Industry [1964], published in the UK and rapidly translated in other 
languages (the German translation Tiermaschinen was published in 1964), 
had a great impact on animal rights activists7. In  this context, the
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8 For those who speak Swiss German: the hundred thousands of signatures were col-
lected for the petition in just a few days,
prompting the government to change its
policies and the biggest retailer to immedi-
ately withdraw cage eggs from its shelves—
facts that are clearly exaggerated. In reality, it
took a long time for animal welfare activists
to achieve these goals. Nonetheless, while
exaggerated, the commentator’s account of
the public’s strong emotional reaction to the
movie is consistent with many contemporary
testimonies—not least the strong rebuttals by
egg producers—and bears witness to the
vivid debates the question provoked (http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0214736/, accessed
April 7, 2016).
movie can be watched on YouTube http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v5eYzrC_jeVHM 
(accessed April 7, 2016). A lone commentator 
on the movie’s imdb site says he remembers 
a screening of the movie at a St. Gallen
movie theater: “I remember the audience’s
reaction to this movie in a St. Gallen cinema
in 1975 when it came out. Women were 
crying, men were shouting that the director
of the movie should be shot (the director was
the committed American-Swiss animal pro-
tector Mark R. Rissi). Children uttered their
wish to go to the next farm and liberate the
animals.” The commentator then goes on to
say that, thanks to the movie, several
traditionally rather conservative sts became a vocal advocate of farm 
animal welfare.
Once the constitutional amendment was approved, animal welfare
activists put pressure on legislators to draft a strong federal animal
protection bill. The battery cages in which hens were held for egg
production quickly became the focus of  activist  campaigns and
public  debates. Animal welfare activists accused the egg industry of
animal cruelty and called for a ban on cages. An sts petition in 1973 
gathered more than 200,000 signatures demanding such a ban. In parallel, 
activists were busy informing the public about the realities of what they
called “chicken factories” or “egg factories.” From 1973 onwards, they 
un-dertook an impressive amount of activities to highlight the existence of
hens held in cages and document cruelty. This included an audiovisual
exhibition, brochures, articles in newspapers and magazines,
documen-taries, and even a fiction film. The film, called De
Grotzepuur (1975)(a Swiss-German title meaning “The farmer from 
Grotze”), was financed by the sts and broadcast on Swiss public TV 
after being screened in movie theaters all over the country. It featured
several famous Swiss German actors of the time and told the dramatic
story of a grumpy animal-abusing farmer and the outrage of his city-
born daughter-in-law8.
The public campaign was initially successful: the draft of the bill
included a ban on cage husbandry for chickens. But this success was
not long-lived. Following the customary Swiss legislative process, the
draft bill was then sent to all concerned parties (i.e. interest groups,
political parties, the cantons) for consultation. In their responses,
many expressed opposition to the ban on cages; in part this was
certainly due to the fact that, in the meantime, the organizations of egg
producers had reacted to the threat by intervening publicly and
lobbying for their interests. Most notably, they launched a broad
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campaign with the goal of objectively informing the public on chicken
husbandry. In early 1977, at the end of the consultation process, the 
government decided to withdraw the cage ban from the bill and
replaced it with a less stringent formulation instead. The bill that was
finally voted by parliament (and widely approved by a popular
majority in a referendum in December 1978) stipulated that “the 
government prohibits forms of husbandry clearly contrary to the
principles of animal welfare.” Which forms this should entail was left
to be decided in a governmental provision. The battle between
advocates of a cage ban and egg producers thus continued to yet
another round. Yet it became increasingly clear that the government,
under pressure from public opinion and animal welfare activists, was
determined to actually ban cages. The provision was finally enacted in
1981. While it prohibited conventional cages and put in place 
a commission charged with testing and authorizing new husbandry
systems, it also gave egg producers using cages a transitional period of
ten years to adapt to the new regulation.
What is animal welfare? The question of morality itself
Animal rights activists brought up the issue of animal welfare. In
their interventions, they took a clear-cut moral stance: holding hens in
cages is animal cruelty. Pictures and documentary movies were aimed
at showing how hens suffered in such conditions. Simply seeing
chickens in cages was evidence enough that this was a case of animal
cruelty—it was a question of common sense. For a “normally feeling
person with ethical responsibility, there can be only one answer”—it is
animal cruelty and therefore cages should be banned (sts 11/12, 
December 195). “It is sufficient to stand in front of a cage for five 
minutes and to observe a hen to be seized by anger against our shallow
welfare society, which does not realize the cost of its well-being” (sts 
3/4, April 1975). Every “normal-feeling” person shares this immedi-
ate emotional and moral reaction and experiences a “moral shock”
[Jasper 1997].
The chicken farmers contested this moral view. Instead of animal
welfare activists’ emotional rhetoric, the poultry industry pleaded for
what they saw as a rational, objective, calm assessment of the situation.
As explained in one article heading, one needs to say “goodbye to
emotions” and let allow rational arguments to guide the public debate
(sgz 6, March 17, 1977). It was with this goal in mind that the
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We chicken farmers are in contact with our animals day in day out. We feed and
water them, we take care that they are not too cold and not too warm, that they
have enough fresh air without being caught in a draught, that there is enough
space at the feeding trough, and that every animal feels secure in the existing
social order. In short, we are professionals and have learnt how to keep animals,
and yet we are increasingly confronted with accusations coming in most cases
from people who only come into contact with chickens or poultry products once
they are put in the pan or on the dinner table. From those people, of whom no
one has learnt the profession at the poultry farming school (Gefl€ugelzuchtschule),
we get lectured about how to treat chickens.
Common sense, the article went on, is not enough; one needs
specific knowledge about chicken genetics, behavior, husbandry,
nutrition, health, and anatomy, in order to judge an animal’s well-
being (sgz 17, October 17, 1974). When properly applied, this 
professional knowledge (institutionalized in the professional training
provided at the Gefl€ugelzuchtschule where the trade journal was edited)
guaranteed that good care was taken of the animals.
Poultry farmers thus put forward their specific, professional
knowledge that allowed them to evaluate what qualifies as animal
welfare, and the professional ethics that ensured that animals were not
harmed. Animal rights activists, who argued on the basis of ethics and
common sense, lacked this professional knowledge and could there-
fore not be taken seriously. The issue at stake here was the basis on
which animal welfare could be assessed, and who was authorized to
make this kind of assessment—in other words, how moral claims can
be grounded [Abend 2014]. For animal welfare activists, this basis was
principal organization of egg producers launched a broad public
information campaign, and put in place a working group to deal with
the issue. They accused activists of letting emotions guide their
judgments and dismissed and ridiculed them. Using often gendered
language, they presented themselves as objective, knowledgeable, (and
exclusively male) specialists suddenly bothered by sentimental, irra-
tional “old aunties in the street” who had never seen a chicken up
close. While this form of blatant male chauvinism was not uncommon
at the time, its rhetorical effectiveness was questionable, since most
consumers were indeed women. Indeed, the categories on which the
egg producers based their dismissal reflected an existing social divide
between them and the activists: the latter tended to be not only more
often female, but also more urban than rural.
Further drawing on the urban/rural divide, representatives of the
egg industry put forward their specific professional knowledge of
chickens:
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the moral outrage felt by every “normal-feeling person.” For poultry
farmers, only professionals could have a say, because they were the
only ones to have the necessary knowledge to enable them to un-
derstand the situation.
However, in this quest for objectivity, poultry farmers could not rely
only on their professional competence and ethics; they also needed
external validation. Since the beginning of the controversy, they had
also built their arguments on scientific evidence, citing statistics and
scientific findings that supported their position. According to the egg
industry’s interpretation of scientific data, evidence actually indicated
that chickens were faring particularly “well” in cages. Compared to
other types of husbandry, cages led to lower rates of chicken mortality
and higher rates of performance (i.e., the hens laid more eggs). For the
industry officials, this meant that hens in cages were doing well:
“Empirically, one observes that hens in cages perform better while
consuming less food than hens in barns, and from this one must conclude
that they also feel better” (sgz 4, April 18, 1974) (my emphasis).
How does one measure animal welfare? Up to the 1970s, most 
studies on farm animals were applied studies often funded by the
agricultural industry and carried out in laboratories close to industry.
They researched productivity rather than actual wellbeing, but now
productivity indicators such as performance and mortality were inter-
preted as indicators of animal wellbeing: if hens live long and lay many
eggs, this surely must mean that they also feel good. But the 1970s were 
also a time when new approaches were developed to measure the
welfare of farm animals, “with experiments focusing on the effects of
single factors under controlled circumstances,” which allowed the new
discipline to be established as a science [Carenzi and Verga 2009]. In 
Switzerland and other countries, scientists developed an approach that
defined wellbeing as a function of the satisfaction of needs and the
reduction of harm (Interview with former government official). This led
to a very different way of measuring welfare than through performance
and mortality; it was about observing whether animals could satisfy
their natural needs in modern husbandry systems, and thus tended to
give support to claims made by animal welfare activists.
Such research was increasingly carried out at Swiss universities and
also gained clout in the federal veterinary administration that was in
charge of overseeing the animal protection legislation (Interview with
former government official). Animal welfare activists, sensing that they
could not solely rely on emotional outrage but also needed to ground
their arguments in science, began funding comparative research with
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the goal of scientifically proving that barn systems were superior to
cages in terms of animal welfare. “In the absence of other arguments,
we animal protectionists are repeatedly accused of sentimentality and
professional incompetence by our opponents. This is why we are eager
to substantiate our arguments by professionals and prominent profes-
sors of veterinary studies. We have realized that so-called scientifically
backed statements can only be confronted by even better scientific
counter-evidence” (Yearly report, sts, 11/12, December 1975).
Each side thus tried to ground its moral claims in scientific studies,
and it proved very difficult to empirically assess animal welfare once
and for all, without any persisting doubts. For the egg industry, the
inconclusiveness of scientific studies could only mean that it was
better to wait; as long as scientists could not say whether or not cages
were bad for animal welfare, or if the proposed alternative systems
were any better, it was best not to ban cages yet. In December 1976, 
the industry called for a “truce” with animal rights activists until the
scientific controversy was settled. “Only polemical articles but never
serious examinations have found animal cruelty in impeccably man-
aged battery systems” (sgz, 25, December 9, 1976). But while the egg 
producers’ experts tended to be practice-oriented and had close ties to
industry, in particular through the research facility at the poultry
farming school, the scientists working at independent research in-
stitutes tended to be on the side of animal welfare activists.
In sum, producers denied the moral claims of their opponents.
Chicken batteries were not immoral; on the contrary, they respected
animal welfare just as much as alternative forms of chicken husbandry.
By putting forward their own professional competence to evaluate
animal welfare and pointing to the lack of scientific proof, producers
hoped to create a rational and objective account that would reveal the
groundless nature of activists’ moral outrage. In response, animal
rights activists also grounded their arguments in science in order to
foster their credibility. However, they did not deny that theirs was also
an emotional appeal, a moral reaction that was just as legitimate.
“How could one confront the misery of animal cruelty in an objective
way?” (sts, 4, December 1977).
Grub before ethics? The “market acceptance” of moral practices
Egg producers did not only object to the authority of animal rights
activists to speak on matters of animal welfare; they did not only
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question the very fact that battery cages qualified as animal cruelty.
Actually, their most powerful argument was not about how to define
animal welfare: it was about economic issues. More precisely, it was
about the economic costs of a cage ban and about the “law of the
market” that demanded that the most rational production methods
had to be adopted. In other words, for producers, the issue was one of
economic, not moral, judgment. Even if there were more animal-
friendly production methods, the reality of the markets could not
accommodate them.
Yet the economic argument itself built on a moral justification of
the existing market order, which the industry rendered explicit in
reaction to the challenge by animal welfare activists. In the industry’s
understanding, the market for eggs was moral in the sense that it
provided consumers with the affordable eggs they demanded. This
was not just rhetoric but was a view grounded in the historical role of
Swiss agriculture and constituted a core element of the egg pro-
ducers’ social identity. In their eyes, they fulfilled a social function,
which was to provide the Swiss economy with eggs and thus
maintain at least an appearance of national food sovereignty. They
were more than just market actors; they occupied an important role
in the country’s independence and survival. References to the wwii 
war economy were frequent and the importance of having an
agricultural production that could fulfill the basic needs of Swiss
consumers was one of the goals of agricultural policies and a source
of pride for producers. At the same time, the government was wary
of overproduction and its effect on prices, and thus tried to limit
production outputs, too. These contradictory goals had led to
a complex market regulation based on three pillars: limits to the
size of production units (through a system of mandatory authoriza-
tion for production facilities of over 2,000 hens, which was, however, 
hardly ever enforced), a tax and an obligation for importers to sell an
equal amount of imported and Swiss eggs, and a regulated price for
the eggs exchanged within this system. These eggs, called “system
eggs,” were sold through several regional eggs cooperatives (the main
one being seg), which collected and then redistributed eggs from the 
different producers. Besides these system eggs, there were also
so-called “grey eggs,” for which there was no regulated price and
no purchase guarantee. Those eggs were sold directly to intermedi-
ary traders, and most of the time came from the specialized chicken
farmers who had the biggest production capacities, almost exclu-
sively using cage systems.
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In the producers’ view, production had to be rationalized
(i.e. industrialized) because consumers were not willing to pay more
for eggs. Confronted with rising costs, the only way to keep prices
down was this rationalization. According to the egg industry, intensive
animal husbandry developed out of economic survival needs, not out
of greed, as animal welfare activists sometimes claimed. For instance,
one of its main organizations, vsgh, said in a press release that its “task 
[was] to produce a cheap egg for the whole population, which [was], as
proved by inquiries, only possible with modern cage husbandry” (sgz 
21-22, December 19, 1974). The higher costs of alternative, cage-free
systems would lead to higher prices for consumers, or else producers
would lose money and ultimately be driven out of business. Swiss eggs
might even disappear from the market altogether, to the profit of
cheap imported eggs. In other words, the economic and social costs of
a cage ban would be significant: poultry farmers would be driven out
of business, jobs would be lost, and Switzerland could no longer aspire
to food sovereignty. Only cages could guarantee profitable production
and they were thus necessary in order to maintain a functioning,
efficient market for Swiss eggs.
For egg producers, the demands for a cage ban thus endangered the
economic efficiency of egg production; alternative husbandry forms
lacked economic feasibility or, as they frequently put it, “market
acceptance.” Egg producers were convinced that consumers were
driven by narrow self-interest, meaning that they would always buy
the cheapest products. They might claim otherwise and even sign
petitions demanding a ban on cages, but when purchasing eggs at the
supermarket, “grubs first, then ethics” would always prevail. The egg
industry believed in the economic theory of consumers as self-
interested actors, not moral beings.
In the eyes of animal welfare activists, something was wrong with
a market whose goal was to produce cheap eggs for self-interested
consumers. Was it really so important to produce cheap eggs if the
price to pay was animal cruelty? The activists’ answer was clearly no:
“The probability that Switzerland decays from a lack of egg white is
smaller than the danger that it be doomed by a lack of decency” (sts 3/4, 
April 5, 1975). The imperatives of profitability and cheap prices had 
removed all other concerns from this market, in particular issues of
animal rights or environmental justice. The animal protection bill should
enable these ethical concerns to put limits on profitability, so that purely
economic and material interests would not rule animal husbandry. But at
the same time, the sts as the leading animal welfare organization wanted
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9 At the same time, another such develop-
ment was under way: the build-up of an
exchange circuit (a “circuit of commerce,”
Zelizer 2011) around free-range eggs. This
went much further in terms of animal welfare
than the cage-free eggs from the sts. It
significantly contributed to the development
of alternative, animal friendly categories and
forms of valuation on the market and to the
rise of consumer consciousness. But it could
not constitute a viable economic alternative
for mainstream producers. It was a much
more far-reaching critique of industrial farm-
ing, and the organization behind it was very
critical of the type of husbandry promoted by
the sts. The latter was designed precisely as
something that conventional large-scale pro-
ducers could switch to quite easily, and could
accommodate the industrial nature of egg
production by allowing for concentration
and significant quantities.
to make it clear that it did not advocate a nostalgic, unprofitable form of
chicken husbandry. Rather than just lamenting the dominance of
profitability to the detriment of animal welfare, the activists wanted to
demonstrate that animal welfare could in fact be compatible with
markets.
The sts thus decided to start an experiment that “will point at 
a practicable way for an animal friendly chicken husbandry [.] [O] 
nly the demonstration of a feasible alternative solution could provide
the basis to fight credibly for a ban on cage husbandry” (sts magazine 
11/12, December 1975, annual report). This led the way for a distinc-
tively market-based strategy: the sts would try to build up a market 
for cage-free eggs as a viable alternative to dominant egg production9. 
First, the sts organized a market test in the city of Winterthur. 
Collaborating with a farmer who had a cage-free production facility,
eggs were sold on the local market with a label clearly designating
them as cage-free, for a price that was approximately 15% higher than 
the regular price. The egg industry admonished the farmer for taking
part in the experiment. At the start—perhaps slightly fearful of what
would come to light—they “distance(d) themselves from this short-
term experiment, which does not give indications neither on chicken
husbandry nor on market behavior of a broad range of consumers”
(sgz 21-22, December 19, 1974). Later, however, egg producers 
rejoiced at the test results: they indicated that only a rather small
percentage of consumers were prepared to buy the animal-friendly
eggs. For the industry, this was clear evidence that consumers did not
put ethics before cost. “Around 90% of consumers were not ready to 
support the postulates of the animal welfare activists financially,
through the price premium of the eggs.” Consumers, they said, had
proven that one could not negate economic necessity and that the use
of emotional, yet not objectively founded arguments could not dupe
them: “the idealism of the majority of consumers stops at the price”
(sgz 5, March 4, 1976).
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The goal of [this action] is to rebut the claim of chicken farmers [that consumers
will purchase the cheaper egg if the price difference is 3 to 5 Rappen, even if they
know that it was produced under conditions of animal cruelty] [.] This action
must be a success. Opponents haven’t succeeded in convincingly attacking
animal welfare arguments advocated by activists from animal welfare, conser-
vation and environmental organizations. If, in addition, we succeed in breaking
into the economic front and to demonstrate that consumers are willing to pay
a premium price, an additional essential step toward a ban on cages will be done
(sts, 3/4, April 1976, emphasis in original).
“Breaking into the economic front” meant showing that ethical
concerns could be part of consumers’ purchase decisions and were not
opposed to such decisions. If animal welfare advocates could both
scientifically show that cages amounted to animal cruelty and dem-
onstrate that consumers wanted cage-free eggs, the egg industry
would have few arguments left.
With their activities on the supply side (labeling products) and on
the demand side (informing consumers with the goal of changing their
preferences), the activists thus launched a process of qualification
[Callon, M!eadel and Rabeharisoa 2002] and valuation [Beckert and 
Aspers 2011] in the egg market. Qualification and valuation were 
themselves part of the moral struggle. Moral entrepreneurs tried
establishing moral quality as a criterion for distinction, choice, and
valuation. An egg would need to be seen as more valuable if it came
For the sts, however, the test only proved that consumers were not 
yet sufficiently informed about the cruelty of cage husbandry. In April
1976, they teamed up with a major Swiss-German women’s magazine, 
called Annabelle. Over several months, the magazine would publish
(often quite graphic) reports on the egg industry, revealing the cruelty
of cage husbandry. In parallel, eggs from cage-free producers were put
on the market with the label “Annabelle-Ei” (Annabelle egg), certified
cage-free by the sts. Again, the eggs were sold for a slightly higher 
price than regular eggs. For a few months, the magazine published
lists with grocery stores where they could be purchased—a list that
contained dozens of stores, including Jelmoli, one of the largest and
most fashionable department stores in Zurich. In the course of the
Annabelle campaign, the sts made over 80 contracts with egg 
producers, covering around 250,000 hens (sts, 1, March 1978, annual 
report 1975-77).
Through this action, the sts and Annabelle crafted a message that 
managed to reach out to many consumers, most of them women. For
the sts, it was a crucial step in its effort to show the market potential 
of cage-free eggs.
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The eggs regulation pushes producers to promote, in particular, “the quality [of
eggs]”. With an information campaign running over several months, we would
like to show that there is also a non-palpable, ethical quality [.]. Maybe we will
succeed in creating a need for an ethical quality with regard to eggs, a modest
and yet so important food product.
The goal was thus to expand the notion of what egg quality entails:
not only freshness, taste, or size, which were the qualities usually
associated with eggs, but also the ethical aspect of conditions of
production––the issue of chicken husbandry. It was about creating
new needs in consumers, needs of a moral order; making consumers
realize that when they want eggs, they don’t just want fresh eggs, they
also want eggs from hens kept in animal-friendly conditions.
The egg industry vehemently contested such attempts of moral
qualification. For the industry, there could be no difference between
cage, cage-free, and free-range eggs: they were all one and the same.
Annabelle concedes that there is no identifiable quality difference between cage
and cage-free eggs. What will be the reaction of consumers when they find out?
Two kinds! First, the majority of them will hardly be willing to pay 15% more,
as the market test [.] clearly showed. Second, they can become suspicious of
the declaration and think that they have been conned when they find out that
a so-called Annabelle egg or a free-range egg does not differentiate itself at all
from a regular egg, possibly from cages and 5 cents cheaper. No difference from
the inside or the outside, in taste, smell, or appearance (sgz 8, April 15, 1976).
The author of these lines refuses to acknowledge the point made by
the advocates behind the Annabelle campaign. The only qualities of
eggs that might justify a higher price were taste, smell, and appear-
ance; chicken husbandry could not. Further on, the author argues that
the problem with husbandry is that it cannot be controlled, and
therefore should not be declared on packages. But why should it not
be possible to control husbandry? And how can the aspects that are
admitted as qualities—taste, smell—be controlled? The distinction
and the argument made by the egg industry is a consequence of its
strong stance in favor of battery cages, which are not, in the industry’s
eyes, contrary to animal welfare. Just as the animal welfare advocates
were trying to “create a need for ethical qualities” and establish this
new category on the market, the producers, fearing not just
from cage-free hens. The campaign in the Annabelle magazine was
explicitly designed to do so. A letter by the editor-in-chief of
Annabelle to the Swiss Minister of Economic Affairs, published in
the sts magazine (5/6, May 1976), explained the campaign in the 
following words:
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10 The kag criticized these names and published a list in its newsletter in 1981, from where
these examples are taken.
a legislative ban on cages but perhaps even more consumers’ changing
preferences, were trying to prevent this category from emerging. This
struggle carried on well into the 1980s, when cage-free activists 
lobbied for a government-backed declaration clearly distinguishing
cage-free eggs, and egg producers fought against it.
In spite of this resistance by the egg industry, the “market
acceptance” of cage-free eggs started growing with the campaigns of
the sts. Consumers bought the “moral” eggs and paid a premium for 
them. An indicator of the emergence of this moral market was the fact
that producers increasingly tried to take advantage of the segment of
consumers demanding cage-free eggs. In spite of the egg industry’s
political opposition, declarations that implied in one way or another
that eggs were held cage-free or even free-range, started to appear: the
official sts label and the free-range eggs certified by kag, but also 
many other declarations, started to circulate. At the beginning of the
1980s, one could find on the market names such as “Sunn-Ei” (sun-
egg), “Nest-Ei” (nest egg), Landei (land-egg), Kikeriki, or simply
“eggs from the farm.”10 These names suggested that the chickens 
somehow had more space than those in cages. They refer to the
outdoors—sun, land, the natural habitat of chickens (nests, or farms),
and packaging often made explicit reference to free-range or cage-free
production modes. All this suggests that the categories cage-free and
free-range had gained acceptance and importance on the market. For
some producers, that represented an added value. The egg industry
organizations had thus been wrong about consumers’ mere self-
interest: many of them proved willing to pay more for cage-free eggs.
However, reaching that point required the moral work of animal
welfare organizations and the establishment of new moral categories of
quality and valuation.
The political struggle: factory farms or family farms?
Why did the egg producers lose the moral struggle and why did
cage-free eggs become so popular as to hasten a change in markets
even before the regulation took hold? Certainly, the moral work
undertaken by animal welfare activists was an important factor. This
included the information campaigns and the efforts made to develop
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a viable alternative that would be made available through labeled
products and public campaigns. But we also need to look at the other
side and analyze the failure of egg producers to impose their own
point of view and their alternative morality, thus contextualizing the
moral struggle.
To do this, we need to take a closer look at the agricultural sector
and the position of chicken farming within it. Often, agricultural
interests have strong networks reaching deep inside state adminis-
trations, and Switzerland is no exception. However, within the field of
Swiss farming, the position of egg producers was actually quite
unique. As primarily highly specialized production units, they dif-
fered from most farmers in other sectors who relied on more di-
versified and much less intensive and industrialized productions.
Indeed, chicken farmers—in their majority egg producers, since
poultry meat production was never an important economic sector in
Switzerland—were by far the most industrialized sector of Swiss
agriculture. The rationalization of egg production, the concentration,
specialization, and size of these production units had no equal in other
segments of Swiss agriculture such as dairy production, cattle or even
pork. As such, chicken farmers were outliers within Swiss agricul-
ture—especially those most vocally opposed to the cage ban: those
represented by the vsgh who were specialized egg farmers. This 
weakened the egg industry. Their business model made them espe-
cially vulnerable to the rising critique of industrialized farming,
a critique that was even shared, at least in part, by the Swiss farmers
association. For many, not least for fellow farmers, they were not real
farmers. This critique crystallized around the term “factory farm”:
animal rights activists, but also sometimes fellow agricultural pro-
ducers, accused egg producers of running factory farms, a label the
egg industry strongly rejected.
The controversy around the moral treatment of animals was thus
part of a much larger debate around the right way to do farming.
Should the goal be an ever more efficient, industrialized type of
farming, which would mean concentration in ever bigger and more
productive farms? This model had characterized Swiss agricultural
policy in the post-war years, with subsidies depending on farm sizes.
But it was now increasingly criticized, building on different points of
view: not only an animal rights perspective, but also an environmental
perspective and what could be called a conservative perspective,
favoring traditional small-scale family farms rather than the develop-
ment of a concentrated agro-business. Egg producers found
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themselves in an uneasy position within this battle. They came to
represent the business side of agriculture, a role they struggled with
and refused to identify with. But the egg producers’ position was
contradictory: they were proud of their efficient and specialized
production units that allowed them to compete on “free” markets.
They ridiculed the “egg nostalgia” of animal welfare activists, who
wanted hens to go back to picking corn in open fields and “renounce
well-balanced food in sufficient quantity, a secure and hygienically
immaculate house with sufficient protection from foxes and other
animals” (sgz 13, August 22, 1974). Yet the egg producers strived to 
be perceived as family farmers––as typical, traditional farmers who
were close to their animals and struggling to make ends meet. They
embraced efficiency and productivity, but they refused to be called
factory farmers.
Appearing as family farmers rather than factory farmers was thus
a strategic identity [Bernstein 1997] in the moral struggles around 
cage bans. It was not only the industry’s main opponents––the animal
welfare activists––who contested this label. It also came under
increased criticism by members of their own trade. Not all farmers
identified with the quest for rationalization, and many reproached egg
producers as not being real farmers. Already in 1974, the pages of the 
poultry journal complained about “incomprehensible and misplaced
friendly fire from our own side” when the agricultural press agency
published an article highly critical of factory farms attacking, in
particular, poultry farmers (sgz 8, June 13, 1974). Letters from 
individual poultry farmers published in the journal repeatedly criti-
cized the intensification and rationalization that was driving the egg
industry.
These internal conflicts indicate that, in reality, neither the farmers
at large nor the smaller group of poultry farmers were unified
categories. Farmers were divided into different production sectors
and also between large-scale and small-scale farmers. This distinction
also characterized the egg industry, where a great number of small
producers, supplying the protected market for “system eggs” with
broods of often far less than 2,000 hens, faced a much smaller number 
of large, specialized producers mostly selling directly to traders and
retailers on the so-called gray market. The latter were the most
vociferously opposed to cage bans. They had a strong and combative
professional identity, having managed to develop a successful business
model at the margins of the regulated agricultural sector. Inside the
circles of the egg industry, they were called “the wild ones,” in
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reference to their maverick status (Interview with representative of egg
industry). But now they were the ones who had the most to lose from
a change in the system, because making a transition would be more
costly for them than for the smaller producers. And they were the ones
most frequently singled out by opponents, since they corresponded to
the image of factory farmers, whereas smaller producers resembled
more the image of traditional farmers (although both groups used
cages). They were therefore criticized not only by animal welfare
activists, but also by other farmers who thought that they were not
really farmers anymore. In quite a few instances, the pages of the sgz 
show that egg farmers experienced the attacks and the moral
devaluation [Farrell 2015] of their profession in a very personal 
manner. In a letter to the editor, one poultry farmer complained that,
in the movie Grootzepuur, “a whole profession is devalued. [.] 
I learned the profession of poultry farmer in 1959/1961 when batteries 
were already common. Since then batteries have kept improving, and
today, when a great many have built up an existence, they are publicly
stigmatized” (sgz 15, July 21, 1977).
The long-time president of the vsgh complained in an editorial 
(sgz 22, November) that the “monument that animal welfare activists 
are building for themselves [.] is constructed at the expense of 
a whole profession and does nothing good for the animal. They are
pointing fingers at us: look at these animal abusers!” The moral
struggle undoubtedly touched upon the core professional identity of
poultry farmers and hurt their professional pride; more than just an
attack on their economic interests, the moral struggle was experienced
as a condemnation of their very self [Farrell 2015]. It would seem that 
this perception of being unfairly singled out and publicly stigmatized
reinforced the professionals’ attachment to battery cages and their
fighting spirit long after the battle was lost.
In the end, the divisions within farmers, along with the announced
structural changes in agricultural policy away from a strategy of
promoting size, specialization and concentration towards rewarding
differentiation and small-scale farms [Schmid and Lehmann 2001; 
Wilson 2011], helped establish cage-free eggs on markets. For smaller 
producers, transitioning to cage-free systems was less costly. Selling
cage-free eggs could be a business opportunity for them, especially in
the early stages. The producers participating in the Annabelle cam-
paign and then searching certification from the sts were such small-
scale poultry farmers that they could quite easily transition, or that had
never adopted battery cages in the first place. In addition, with its goal
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of production diversification, a new federal policy subsidized so-called
replenishment productions, which further favored the rapid develop-
ment of cage-free systems. Many of the producers advertising cage-free
eggs were thus new on the market; they had never had cages and began
directly with cage-free production facilities. Together with egg traders
and the egg distribution cooperative, coop builders approached small
farmers, inciting them to build cage-free systems and supply a market
characterised by increasing demand.
In sum, this meant that the relatively rapid transition to cage-free
systems was also favored by a division within the poultry industry and
new policies advantaging small-scale producers. The powerful major
egg producers were on the losing side of a much broader shift that was
under way. The moral struggle they were involved in did not just
concern the question of animal welfare, but more generally the
direction that Swiss agriculture would take. The battle on the ban
of chicken cages unfolded on the background of a paradigm shift in
agricultural policy, from a productivist paradigm towards one of
diversification, ecology, and animal welfare. In the end, the egg
industry could not resist the change. They tried out certain techno-
logical innovations—the so-called enhanced cage systems—but they
were all rejected by the commission responsible for applying the new
law (Interview with former government official). When the major
retailers switched to a cage-free only policy a few years before the
official transitory period ended, all producers were forced to give up
the cages. But in contrast to their ominous predictions, and in spite of
the lack of any accompanying measures such as import restrictions,
they actually fared very well by all accounts. This had to do with
circumstantial factors––a generally favorable market situation with
high prices at the time—but also with the fact that Swiss consumers
largely favored cage-free eggs. The egg industry fully acknowledged
the new animal welfare quality of Swiss eggs when, in 1992, it 
launched an advertising campaign under the slogan “The Swiss egg,
a taste of liberty!” They now proudly embraced what they had fought
so obstinately for more than ten years (sgz 7, July 16, 1992).
Discussion and conclusion
It has been widely established that markets are also morally
embedded [Beckert 2012; Fourcade and Healy 2007]. The moral
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boundaries of markets and market practices are contested [Steiner and
Trespeuch 2014; Zelizer 1983]: established and morally sanctioned 
market conventions can be challenged by moral entrepreneurs––
something which has arguably taken place at an increased pace since
the 1970s as social movement actors single out corporations and 
markets as targets of moral and political protest [Soule 2009]. But how 
do struggles on the moral embeddedness of markets play out? The
focus of the theoretical approach developed in this paper is on moral
struggles as social and political processes through which moral
boundaries and commensuration are contested and negotiated. Ana-
lyzing the historical case of the battle about battery cages in the Swiss
egg industry, the study attempts to reveal the defining characteristics
of moral struggles in markets.
First, the case shows how moral market struggles are fought in
such distant fields as the science of animal welfare and how debates on
morality inform questions of market practices and regulation. While
activists denounced the cruel treatment of animals, egg farmers denied
such claims and pointed to their own impeccable professional ethics.
Both sides thus developed essentially moral discourses, grounded in
different moral orders. Furthermore, in an attempt to legitimize their
accounts, both sides also made appeals to scientific measurement as an
“unbiased” way of settling the question. While this was superficially
about commensuration, the recourse to science was also strategic; it
could not solve the underlying moral conflict. Each side produced and
relied on its own scientific expertise (for a similar observation in the
case of environmental conflict, see Farrell 2015).
Second, the struggle also took place directly in the market arena,
around the question of the cost of higher moral standards and thus
their compatibility with the “law of the market.” The moral work of
animal welfare activists aimed at making their moral views compatible
with markets; to do so, they attempted to change consumer prefer-
ences and establish a new (ethical) quality for eggs and their valuation.
But commensuration qua markets was contested by the egg industry.
Since for them, cage systems were legitimate and there was thus no
moral difference between husbandry systems, eggs could not have an
ethical quality and claims of morally superior eggs were therefore
rejected. But increasingly, some egg producers also came to see this
new quality as a business opportunity. They embraced it by selling
eggs under labels and designations that referred to the improved
conditions of chicken husbandry. In these instances, the struggle for
market share created a breach in the position and strategy of the
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industry association. More and more egg producers followed this
path, as the demand for cage-free eggs grew.
Finally, moral market struggles are also political struggles: moral
boundaries of markets are also decided through political rule-making.
Power and status struggles [Gusfield 1984 [1963]] also inform moral 
struggles and serve to achieve commensuration between competing
values. Egg producers felt unjustly singled out and devalued in their
professional identity, which can account for their long-lasting persis-
tence in the battle. But, as highly specialized producers, egg farmers
were isolated within the field of farming and could not count on the full
support of traditional allies. Many other Swiss farmers were themselves
critical of the specialized, industrialized business model championed by
the egg industry. In addition, the tide was turning in favor of a different
kind of agricultural policy, away from the production model of the
specialized egg producer. The battle surrounding battery cages turned
out to be a forerunner of the upcoming changes in agricultural policy
towards integrated and sustainable production.
Struggles around the (im-)morality of certain practices, their market
acceptance and political battles around new regulations can be found
wherever the moral embeddedness of markets is contested. For
instance––to continue with the egg example—a battle around battery
cages for egg production is currently being fought in the us. The people 
of California accepted a ballot measure in 2008 effectively banning 
battery cage systems, and the law took effect on January 1, 2015 
[Bittman 2015]. This moral struggle plays out in the same three arenas 
identified in the Swiss case. A cursory look at the arguments and
strategies of the egg industry shows for instance how the American egg
industry questioned the animal welfare benefits of alternative barn
systems, defended its professional knowledge on animal welfare, and
brought in scientific experts to compare and evaluate animal welfare. It
also reveals how market viability was at stake as producers raised
economic arguments about rising prices for eggs, consequences for
consumers, and the danger of driving egg production out of the us to 
countries where control is impossible (Promar International 2009; 
United Egg Producers undated). By distinguishing between different
dimensions in which moral struggles play out, and characterizing the
stakes within each, the analytical framework developed in this study
should prove helpful for further analyses of similar cases of moral
market struggles and processes of market moralization.
More generally, the case is exemplary in showing how the moral
embeddedness of markets is not only fought out in different arenas
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but also concerns all aspects of markets: production technology as well
as product categories, regulation and issues of product declaration,
producers, consumers, and the many intermediaries that populate
markets. It crops up in issues of market coordination around value,
competition, and coordination [Beckert 2009], and structures the 
social networks, institutions, and cognitive frames that constitute
market fields [Beckert 2010]. In short, it is all over the economy. 
This becomes especially visible in cases of moral contestation and
change, when taken-for granted conventions are questioned and
contested on moral grounds, and when moral boundaries of markets
are renegotiated. But this does not mean that morality was not present
before moral entrepreneurs entered the stage; simply, the underlying
value-mix was of a different kind, and largely invisible because taken-
for granted. Once market actors are challenged on moral grounds,
they are forced to justify their economic actions, and thus to render
explicit their moral underpinnings. Moral struggles are thus a power-
ful strategy for revealing how the economy is “shot through with
values” [Fischer, 2014a: 5].
The Swiss battle around battery cages strongly suggests that, even in
a case that at first sight seems to clearly oppose moral activists to an
“immoral” industry that exploits chickens, one cannot do justice to the
latter without acknowledging that their actions also had other motives
than mere economic interests. As this analysis makes clear, morality
cannot be reduced to being simply an after-thought to or a disguise for
economic or political interests. Not only did it motivate actions on both
sides of the argument; it had a direct influence on the changing outlook of
this market, inscribing itself in law, technology, and market categories.
But this morality is in turn entangled with wide-ranging political and
economic processes and interests, from which markets are not separated.
Struggles on power and status as well as the pursuit of economic interests
both underlie struggles on moral boundaries and are affected by them.
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Zusammenfassung
Marktpraktiken sind umf€anglich reglemen-
tiert und manchmal umstritten aufgrund von
moralischen Urteilen. Moral entrepreneurs
fechten M€arkte und Marktpraktiken an,
w€ahrend Firmen und Industrieverb€ande
sie verteidigen. Dies f€uhrt zu moralischen
K€ampfen wo sich unterschiedliche
Wertordnungen gegen€uber stehen. Basier-
end auf einer historischen Fallstudie wird in
diesem Artikel ein theoretischer Ansatz
entwickelt zur Untersuchung von moral-
ischen K€ampfen in M€arkten als soziale
und politische Prozesse um die Frage der
Kommensurabilit€at. Es werden drei Arenen
identifiziert, wo die moralischen K€ampfe
stattfinden. In der Arena der Ideen ist die
Moralit€at der Praktiken an sich umk€ampft,
und Akteure verankern ihre moralischen
Forderungen in unterschiedlichen institu-
tionellen Ordnungen zur Legitimation. In
der €okonomischen Arena der M€arkte geht es
um die “Marktakzeptanz” der sich
ver€andernden moralischen Standards. In der
politischen Arena schliesslich wird
Kommensurabilit€at erreicht durch Regulation
als Resultat von politischen Machtk€ampfen.
Eine sozio-historische Analyse des Kampfes
gegen Batteriehaltung in der Schweizer Eier-
produktion in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren
verdeutlicht die Prozesse dieses moralischen
Kampfes in jenen Arenen. Dabei werden die
sich konkurrierenden Diskurse, Strategien und
Taktiken der moral entrepreneurs und Industri-
everb€ande in den Vordergrund gestellt.
Schl€usselw€orter : Markt; Moral; Moralische
K€ampfe; Commensurability; Soziale Bewe-
gungen; Valuation.
R!esume!
Les pratiques dans les march!es sont large-
ment r!eglement!ees et parfois contest!ees sur la 
base de jugements moraux. Des entrepre-
neurs moraux remettent alors en cause des
march!es et des pratiques marchandes tandis 
que des entreprises et des associations indus-
trielles les d!efendent, ce qui r!esulte des luttes 
morales opposant diff!erents ordres de gran-
deur. Sur la base d’une !etude de cas histor-
ique, cet article d!eveloppe un cadre th!eorique 
qui !etudie les luttes morales dans les march!es 
en tant que processus sociaux et politiques
autour de la commensurabilit!e. Il identifie 
trois ar#enes-cl!es dans lesquelles se jouent les 
luttes morales. L’are#ne des id!ees, o#u la mo-
ralite! de certaines pratiques en tant que telles 
est contest!ee et les acteurs ancrent leurs 
jugements moraux dans diff!erents ordres 
institutionnels afin de les l!egitimer ; 
l’!economie, ou# l’enjeu est la viabilit!e mar-
chande des standards moraux changeant ;
et l’ar#ene politique, ou# la commensuration 
refl#ete des luttes de pouvoir politique. 
travers une analyse socio-historique du
mouvement contre les batteries d’!elevage
dans la production des œufs en Suisse dans 
les ann!ees 1970 et 1980, cette !etude d!ecrit 
comment cette lutte morale se d!ecline le long 
de ces dimensions, en focalisant sur les dis-
cours, strat!egies et tactiques utilis!es par les 
principaux entrepreneurs moraux et associa-
tions industrielles.
Mots-cl!es : March!e ; Morale ; Lutte morale ; 
Commensurabilite! ; Mouvements sociaux ; 
Valuation.
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